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THE CONCEPT OF BEING OF REASON AS THE FINAL STEP
IN THE METAPHYSICAL COGNITION
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Abstract: The paper concerns Suárez' analysis of being of reason (*ens rationis*), which is often considered as the relational concept between metaphysics and logic. The study applies to the famous Jesuit of the Renaissance, whose philosophy is still little known and even surprising, although often misinterpreted. The paper contains references to source literature and some contemporary materials. I focused on the analysis of Suárez' opinion, who returns to the classical division into real being (*ens reale*) and mind-dependent being (*ens rationis*). Accordingly, Suárez' theory of real being – considered as the real essence of being (*essentia realis*) and the main subject of metaphysics – is directly linked to both the objective being (*ens obiectivum*), the cognitive being (*ens cognitum*), and the first and second intentions of intellect (*prima et secunda intentio*), and in this respect he deals with the being of reason. The concept of being of reason plays a key role in establishing the conditions for an adequate understanding of the true and real object of metaphysics itself. I focused on this issue in a fairly profound and far-reaching Suárez' approach.

Keywords: Francisco Suárez, being of reason, *ens rationis*, metaphysical cognition.

1. THEORETICAL OUTLINE

It is fairly well known among historians of philosophy, though not always correctly justified, that Suárez broke with the traditional approach to the subject of metaphysics and thus shifted the classical reflection on being from the existential approach *ad mentem Divi Thomae* towards the modern essentialism. It is just that his

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metaphysics does not focus on the concept of being in an existential perspective, as was the case in the Thomistic tradition of the past centuries, but it proves to be the study of being abstracted as *ratio entis* or as the real essence of being (*essentia realis*). In his last disputation LIV *De entibus rationis* (*On beings of reason*), Suárez moves from the object of metaphysics perceived as a real being to the definition of being which cannot exist in reality except the intellect's realm, namely towards the so-called mind-dependent being (*ens rationis*). In this very cognitive shift, it might seem that such a mind-dependent being, otherwise called the being of reason, cannot be the subject of metaphysics, which is the study of real properties of being within the reflection on reality. Therefore, as something unreal, the being of reason should be excluded from the subject of metaphysics as such¹.

Nonetheless, as I will try to demonstrate in the following sections, for Suárez (†1617), the subject of metaphysics is conceived in the essential or intentional order (noetic), hence everything what is cognized is being apprehended by the intellect *per modum entis*, regardless of whether it is a real or mental entity, or simply an imaginary entity. This allows him to include *ens rationis* and other intentional objects (e.g. impossible, fictitious) in the scope of metaphysical consideration. Moreover, it seems quite reasonable to say that Suárez' theory tends to explain more deeply the nature of all objects of pure intellect (even unreal or false beings) and thus brings it closer to the truthful-criterion of reality. It is obtained within the framework of a metaphysical apprehension on the side of the objective being (*tantum obiective*).

Having said that, the theory of being of reason turns out to be a kind of *criterium veritatis metaphysicae*, although taken as a non-basic approach by proving of real being indirectly, instead of proving it directly by means of its transcendental properties. Suárez' concept of being of reason reveals as a theory that verifies abstract cognition, and it becomes an indispensable cognitive tool for a science

¹ On the beings of reason in Suárez and in Renaissance scholasticism, see J.P. DOYLE. *Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth* (2). "Vivarium" 26:1988 p. 51-72; IDEM. *Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth* (1). "Vivarium" 25:1987 p. 47-75; G. KLIMA. *The changing role of entia rationis in mediaeval semantics and ontology*. "Synthese" 96:1993 No. 1 p. 25-59; D.D. NOVOTNÝ. *Arriaga (and Hurtado) against the Baroque Mainstream: The Case of Ens rationis*. "Filosoficky Casopis" 64:2016 p. 119-144; IDEM. *Suárez on Beings of Reason*. In: *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*. Leiden 2015 p. 248-273; IDEM. *Ens Rationis From Suárez to Caramuel: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era*. New York 2013; IDEM. *Twenty Years after Suárez: Francisco de Araújo on the Nature, Existence, and Causes of Entia rationis*. In: *Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders: Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle*. Milwaukee 2013 p. 241-268; IDEM. *Rubio and Suárez: A Comparative Study on the Nature of Entia Rationis*. In: *Bohemia Jesuitica 1556-2006*. Prague 2010 p. 477-490; IDEM. *Forty-Two Years after Suárez*. *Mastri and Belluto's Development of the «Classical» Theory of Entia Rationis*. "Quaestio" 8:2008 p. 473-498; IDEM. *Prolegomena to a Study of Beings of Reason in Post-Suarezian Scholasticism, 1600-1650*. "Studia Neoaristotelica: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism" 3:2012 p. 117-141; CH. SHIELDS. *Shadows of being: Francisco Suarez's Entia Rationis*. In: *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*. Oxford 2012 p. 57-74.

seeking the true and real object of knowledge. His metaphysics has been commented on by many who not always seemed to notice the significant consequences of placing the theory of *ens rationis* as the last step or thread in the metaphysical inquiries.

A comprehensive explanation of the being of reason (*ens rationis*) in Suárez' entire system becomes extremely difficult. Presumably it could be adopted for two reasons. First, the Aristotelian and neoplatonic traditions are both extensive. They bound the category of being either with real substance or a certain idea relating to and correlated with a real being, or finally with the abstracted nature of real being (*essentia*), but simultaneously excluding all mental or impossible beings from the metaphysical frameworks. Second, the problem of modern essentialism, which has sturdily categorized being conceptually rather than realistically, is equally important because the metaphysical essentialism – especially in the modern sense – treats the category of real being in a fairly broad context of definition, even extending the meaning of the medieval sense of *ens in commune*. These assumptions and the like, according to which various denominations of being can be expressed in one determined *intentional concept* within the intellect or soul, mattered for the theory of being of reason as opposed to the theory of real being.

Most likely, these threads emerge in Suárez' thought, which in some places brings to mind the univocal concept of being (*univocitas entis*) as third nature (*natura tertia*) in the philosophy of Avicenna (†1037) and Duns Scotus (†1308)². Enough to mention that Scotus begins with Avicenna's concept of *essence* as the *third nature*, indicating that the *third nature* is *ens omnino communissime*, which seems to suggest that the concept of being includes all denominations of real existence. It possibly excludes all intentional beings internally contradicted (*entia impossibilia*), e.g. chimera, Pegasus, centaur, square circle, man-lion, other-God (*alius Deus*), deer-goat (*hircoervus*)³. Scotus pointed to the order of *second intention* where the intellect apprehends an essence of being by the *objective concept*, which is characterized by an undifferentiated state of *essentia*⁴. It should be noted that for Scotus, Avicenna and Suárez alike, the "nature" (*natura* or *essentia*) means the same, namely the most general concept of *ratio entis*, that is, a principle that

² See E. ELORDUY. *Duns Scoti influxus in Francisci Suárez doctrinam*. In: *De Doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti*. Vol. 4 (*Scotismus decursu saeculorum*). Rome 1968 p. 307-337; P. MINGES. *Suárez und Duns Scotus*. "Philosophisches Jahrbuch" 32:1919 p. 334-340.

³ JOANNES DUNS SCOTI. *Quodlibeta III*. In: *Obras del Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto: Cuestiones cuodlibetales* (*Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos*). Ed. F. Alluntis. Madrid 1968 p. 93-94; cf. O. BOULNOIS. *Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIII-XIV siècle)* (*Epiméthée. Essais philosophiques*). Paris 1999 p. 459-462.

⁴ JOANNES DUNS SCOTUS DOCTORIS SUBTILIS. *Questiones super libros Aristotelis De anima*. In: *Opera omnia*. Vol. 2. Ed. L. Wadding. Lyon 1639 q. 17 art. 14. 546a.

applies to all entities despite the diversity of properties at the level of individuals⁵. It also has a certain link with Averroes /† 1198/, for whom the “diminished being” (*ens diminutum in anima*) is a general *ratio entis* (*in genere diminutum generum entis*), that is, the intelligible object of an intellectual apprehension⁶.

All of these issues are revealed in Suárez, whose thought directly and indirectly influenced on subsequent philosophers in the next centuries. Significantly, modern studies on Thomas Aquinas, and consequently Aristotle, came down to interpreting their thoughts in the way as interpreted by Suárez⁷. This undoubtedly could mean a lot in relation to the evolution of many concepts in other systems and philosophical traditions that followed.

2. ENS REALE AS A FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT IN METAPHYSICS

For Suárez, there are only two categories of being: real being, which has many designates, and being of reason, which is a being completely dependent on the intellect⁸. Only a real being is a direct, adequate object of metaphysics, while a being of reason is only a concept that complements this science. It becomes a regulative concept with a certain systemic solution⁹, wherein God is not a direct object of metaphysics, although He remains an independent real being (*Deum non posse esse principale obiectum huius scientiae, si non est adaequatum*)¹⁰. More precisely, the very essential meaning of being, also in noun form, as Suárez suggests, indicates that the subject of metaphysics is the objectified concept of real being as long as it is real (*ens inquantum ens reale*). The essence is contained in the same way in contingent (possible) beings as capable of real existence and in actual beings as having a real existence within¹¹.

⁵ E.I. ZIELIŃSKI. *Jednoznaczność transcendentálna w metafizyce Jana Dunsza Szkota*. Lublin 1988 p. 71.

⁶ AVERROIS. *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros*. In: *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*. Vol. 4 (*Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis*). Venetiis: Apud Iunctas 1562 (rep. Frankfurt-am-main: Minerva 1962) b. VIII sec. 6 cap. 2 fol. 152v 152r.

⁷ J. DEELY. *Four Ages of Understanding – The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-first Century*. Toronto – Buffalo – London 2001 p. 501.

⁸ F. SUÁREZ. *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by J.P. Doyle. Milwaukee 2004 lib. IV cap. II q. 2.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ F. SUÁREZ. *Disputationes metaphysicae*. In: *Opera omnia*. Editio nova a C. Berton. Vol. 25. Parisiis: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, Bibliopolam editorem 1866 disp. I. sec. 1. art. 9 [hereinafter cited as: *Disputationes metaphysicae*].

¹¹ Suárez does not distinguish here the object from the subject. Cf. F. Suárez. *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. I sec. 2; disp. II sec. 4. In other places he inducted this distinction. Cf. *ibidem* disp. II

It follows that for Suárez the concept of being means an essence apprehended in the aspect of abstracted reality (*praecisive tantum abstrahendo*) and reduced to the objective concept of intellect (*conceptus obiectivus*)¹². In such an objective or abstracted reality of the essence, we also find a univocity of God and creatures, however this is a mere attributive analogy assigned to the property of reality that both God and creatures possess. Thus, the subject of metaphysics in Suárez' approach seems to be the most general concept of being (*obiectum huius scientiae esse ens reale in tota sua latitudine*)¹³. It designates as follows: 1) the highest concept of being as a genus, therefore the most general concept of being as being (*ens qua ens*); 2) its transcendental properties (*passiones entis*); 3) created beings (*creatura*) and beings in potency (*in potentia esse*); 4) spiritual beings (*creatura spiritualis*); 5) and what is fundamental, transcendent, fully actualized (*actus purus*), but it is not the main subject of metaphysics, that is, the indeterminate cause of everything (*causa sui*) – God himself. By incorporating the objectified concept of real being into this, the understanding of the object of metaphysics becomes a very broad issue, but at the same time narrows to only one objective concept of real essence (*essentia realis*). Unlike for Henry of Ghent (†1293), according to whom two separate realities (e.g. spiritual and real) correspond to two distinct concepts of being, in Suárez, however, a “being” means an objective reality shared both in substance and in accidents, and in being that remains in potency or in act. Nevertheless, its unity is only a conceptual unity, namely an abstracted or objectified unity (*ratio communis abstracta ut sit in se una*), because between God and creatures there is no univocity of essence, but an absolute ontological distance¹⁴. Although the concept of reality may indeed (by analogy of attribution) maintain a certain community of the name “being” between God and creatures, yet no community of essential properties is preserved¹⁵.

4. ENS RATIONIS AS AN AUXILIARY CONCEPT IN METAPHYSICS

Suárez' concept of real being (*ens reale*) clearly indicates that his philosophy may contain far-reaching divergences from the Thomistic tradition. It should be indicated as well that Suárez' *Disputationes* is a work of great importance and was quite influential throughout 17th-century Western Europe. We can venture to say that Suárez considered all topics that fall within the scope of traditional metaphysics,

sec. 2 art. 25; disp. VI sec. 3 art. 12; disp. XXXI sec. 2 art. 8; disp. XXXI sec. 3 art. 3; disp. LIV sec. 2 art. 1.

¹² *Ibidem* disp. II sec. 4 art. 1.

¹³ *Ibidem* disp. I sec. 1 art. 3.

¹⁴ *Ibidem* disp. XXVIII sec. 3 art. 21.

¹⁵ *Ibidem* disp. XXVIII sec. 3 art. 11.

possibly detailing them all the way back to Aristotle. One might risk saying that Suárez' *corpus metaphysicum* constitutes a significant summary both in terms of the history of metaphysics and its lecturing order he revealed. Especially the sequence of metaphysical problems arranged in a planned order – which gradually passes from a real being through God's being to a mental being as the last theory of the whole – cannot be found in such a configuration in previous scholastic authors. What deserves a special emphasis is the fact that all considerations over a being of reason were incorporated as the last treaty to the overall range of issues of the second part of *Disputationes metaphysicae*. There is no doubt that this location has no relevance to the book whatsoever, but definitely it is intentional. Presumably as one of the last eminent scholastic minds, he reopens the old scholastic debate on the recognition of the cognitive and ontological status of intentional beings. It indicates the method he has adopted to distinguish the mental sphere from reality, especially to verify the essence of real being itself.

Specifically enough, the being of reason plays a key role in establishing the conditions for an accurate understanding of the object of metaphysics. His metaphysical doctrine was intended to be a science examining the reality in an essential order through *ratio entis*¹⁶. The metaphysics, however, is not concerned with knowing reality either directly or in individual substances, but indirectly in an analogous way, and mainly through an adequate and abstracted concept of being (*adaequatos conceptus*). Suárez' metaphysics was commented on by many of its followers, who, unequally, did not seem to notice the serious consequences of placing this theory within the metaphysical reflexion. Nevertheless, it is extremely important both for theology dealing with spiritual substances and the philosophy dealing with the definition of the intentional concept of being as *essence*, as well as for the truthful thinking that occurs in the course of realistic cognition¹⁷.

Suárez' treatise *De entibus rationis* (*On beings of reason*) is the final dispute and falls within the metaphysical problems of his major work *Disputationes metaphysicae*. With a consciously planned location, this treatise seems to fulfill the gap in all disputes over the beings of reason in earlier centuries, not without reason, but at the same time it does not close the problem¹⁸. Once you followed the author's reasoning, the basic assumption of Suárez' concept becomes apparent. Namely, there is a need for a deeper understanding of relation between the classical division into what exists independently of the intellect (*ens reale*) and what exists only within its apprehension, such as the being of reason (*ens rationis*), fictional being (*ens fictum*), objective being (*ens obiectivum*) etc. Defining a mental being

¹⁶ *Ibidem* disp. III sec. 1 art. 10; disp. III sec. 3 art. 7; disp. IV sec. 8 art. 4-5.

¹⁷ *Ibidem* disp. LIV prol. and disp. LIV sec. 1 art. 4.

¹⁸ Cf. J.F. YELA UTRILLA. *El ente de razón en Suárez*. "Pensamiento" 4:1948 (número extraordinario) p. 271-303; see also J.P. DOYLE. *Suárez on Truth and Mind-Dependent Beings: Implications for a Unified Semiotic*. "Semiotics" 1983 p. 121-133.

in the intellect and distinguishing it from the concept of real being (*ens reale*) is an important aspect of intellectual approach to defining realistic cognition. Such a preliminary assumption ultimately leads to the conclusion that if in metaphysics the predication theory is accepted as the regulative principle of ontology, then the theory of being of reason must be irrevocably incorporated. This condition must necessarily be met if we want metaphysics to be based on the theory of being in general with a strictly developed ontology that deals with the distinction between at least two categories of entities, that is, a real being (*ens reale*) with all its designates to which the concept of being corresponds, and a being of reason (*ens rationis*) which exists only objectively in the intellect in a purely mental way (*tantum objective, tantum rationis*)¹⁹.

The Suárezian analysis of beings of reason, which astonishes with its incredible recognition of the problem, is an invaluable example of scholastic doctrine. It fits in with the scholastic problems concerning the theory of transcendentals, intentionality, as well as the classical concept of truth, and goes far beyond the well-known method of Parmenides (†ok 485 BC), Plato (†347 BC), Aristotle (†322 BC) and other ancient or medieval philosophers, who also reflected on mental, fictional or simply impossible beings. This allows the nature of intentional objects to be explained and thus distinguished from spiritual substances as well, such as God or angels.

In his treatise *On beings of reason (De entibus rationis)*, Suárez moves from the metaphysical concept of being understood as a real being (*ens reale*) – capable of real existence as actual or potential being²⁰ – to the definition of a being that cannot exist in reality and would never exist beyond the intellect (*non existere extra intellectum*). It would seem, therefore, that a being of reason cannot be the subject of metaphysics, which is the science of necessary and real forms occurring within what actually exists in reality external to the intellect. Nevertheless, for Suárez the object of metaphysics is essence or being taken in a wider sense as *ratio entis*, which is understood rather as a single intellectual concept of reality than as merely a real individual substance existing externally and *per se notum secundum se*. Furthermore, *ad similitudo modo*, the intellect perceives conceptually a being of reason as if it were a being (*per modum entis*), and therefore it cannot be completely excluded from the object of metaphysics²¹. For a being of this kind falls within the scope of concept of being because it is cognized in an analogous way to the way every being is apprehended in the intellect. In metaphysics, being is always an analogous and transcendental concept meaning a substance that is ordered to

¹⁹ F. SUÁREZ. *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. II sec. 1 art. 1; disp. LIV sec. 2 art. 2; disp. VIII sec. 2 art. 20; disp. XXV sec. 1 art. 5.

²⁰ *Ibidem* disp. I sec. 1 art. 3; disp. II sec. 4 art. 7-8 and 11.

²¹ *Ibidem* disp. LIV prol.

one's own existence, and the concept of analogy is inseparable from the function of the intellect. Since the intellect itself is real power, then all such objects are treated *per modum entis*, even the privation (*privatio*) is recognized by reference to some place, because the privation or absence is always the lack of something²².

Hence, the metaphysical cognition of all kinds of beings (real, formal, objective, intentional, ideal, spiritual, mental, fictitious) is not a simple concrete or respectively singular cognition, purely substantial, or exclusively classified as sensual, but rather analogous cognition based on specific cognitive relations, essential similarities and proportions covering the whole intellect. Everything that the intellect knows, it knows in the way of being and by analogy, what is precisely an adequate object for the intellect itself²³. As indicated by Suárez, this very analogical cognition is not the same with regard to being of reason. This is not the primary cause of being of reason and, surprisingly, it does not constitute its essence or nature, although Suárez inducts to his metaphysics the concept of "analogy of improper proportionality" (*analogia proportionalitatis impropriae*) or the so-called "imperfect analogy" (*secundum analogiam imperfectam alicuius proportionalitatis*), as well as other numerous cognitive acts²⁴. This cognition, however, has a slightly different character than the cognition of real being, which by definition is the subject of metaphysics²⁵. In the case of being of reason, especially in the case of relation of reason (*relatio rationis*), we are dealing with an analogy at the level of objectifying reflection (*reflexio in actu signato*). It takes the form of *extrinsic denomination* at the level of the intellect alone (*denominatio extrinseca*), or more precisely at the level of the second intention of the intellect (*secunda intentio intellectus*)²⁶.

Attention may also be drawn to the very fact that beings of reason have less reality than real beings, hence the intellect uses a different act of cognition than the act involving the real substance, although it applies a similar way of knowing them by analogy to real beings (*per modum entis*). As something substantial and transcendent in itself, real being precedes all acts of the intellect based on the reality of objects. This, on the other hand, could not happen with being of reason. As for the being of reason, the knowing intellect cannot rely directly on reality. Suárez proves that in this respect we are dealing with a specific cognition in which the *esse* of mental objects is completely dependent on the cognitive activity of the intellect (*esse cognitum*), by no means on reality²⁷. This can lead us to a situation in which the

²² *Ibidem*. sec. 1 art. 4; cf. F. SUÁREZ. *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De Anima*. Introducción y edición crítica por S. Castellote. Vol. 3. Madrid 1991 disp. IX q. 4 art. 4.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Ibidem* disp. IV sec. 8 art. 4; disp. VIII sec. 7 art. 21-22; disp. XXVIII sec. 3 art. 4; disp. XXXII sec. 2 art. 13; disp. XXXIX sec. 3 art. 1; disp. XXXIX sec. 3 art. 12.

²⁵ *Ibidem* disp. I sec. 1 art. 26.

²⁶ F. SUÁREZ. *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. LIV sec. 6 art. 4.

²⁷ *Ibidem* disp. III sec. 1 art. 10.

intellect performs a specific creative role in relation to mental objects by shaping or abstracting them either from the pure imagination or the realm of concepts, or from the formal intentions of the intellect (*prima intentio* or *intentio formalis*). More than that, the intellect can even create in itself beings that are internally contradicted and incapable of existence (e.g. *ens fictum*)²⁸. Moreover, in the 17th century, especially in Jesuit schools, thinkers distinguished between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic intelligibility”. In the case of beings of reason, one can only speak of “extrinsic intelligibility”, that is, cognition derived from the level of the intellect, while the real being has “intrinsic intelligibility” (transcendental) in the being of the thing itself. Although this issue may seem of less importance to metaphysics, it actually leads to the definition of the objective basis for the concept of truth in relation to the ontology of impossible (*entia impossibilia*) and possible beings (*entia possibilia*)²⁹. What is more, surprisingly, it can bring us closer to render the level of intellectual entities as the level of “supertranscendentality”, which has not yet been sufficiently recognized in the history of philosophy³⁰.

It should be emphasized that due to the nature of the object contained in the cognitive act (real or mental), Suárez induces a distinction between cognitive intentions of the first and second level of the intellect (*primae et secundae intentionis*). It makes them operate within the framework of either a formal (*ens formale*) or an objective being (*ens obiectivum*). This, in turn, would argue that the being of reason appears as an object of metaphysics, albeit as an auxiliary concept in the truthful cognition. At the core of Suárez’ metaphysics is the idea of elucidating a theory of “objective being” to define a conceptual structure of intellect, and what essentially involves the distinction between a formal being and an objective being³¹. The former is subjected to reality, while the later – which may contain representations or images of real beings, but also mental, fictional beings, etc. – may not correspond to it in any way³². Depending on whether the act of cognition is directed towards either a real thing (substance) or a concept (mental thing),

²⁸ *Ibidem* disp. II sec. 2 art. 13.

²⁹ See J.P. DOYLE. *Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (2)* p. 51-72; IDEM. *Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (1)* p. 47-75.

³⁰ See IDEM. *On the Borders of Being and Knowing: Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being* (Series 144: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy). Ed. V.M. Salas. Leuven University Press 2012.

³¹ Cf. E. ELORDUY. *El concepto objetivo en Suárez*. “Pensamiento” 4:1948 p. 335-423; R. DARGE. *Ens in quantum ens: Die Erklärung des Subjekts der Metaphysik bei F. Suárez*. “Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales” 66:1999 p. 335-361.

³² F. SUÁREZ. *A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* lib. IV cap. II q. 2; IDEM. *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. II sec. 1-2; disp. VI sec. 7 art. 2; disp. VIII sec. 1 art. 1; disp. LIV sec. 2 art. 1, 5, 13; sec. 6 art. 9-11. On the extrinsic denominations in Suárez, see F. SUÁREZ. *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. XXXIX art. 6-7 and 37; disp. XVI sec. 1 art. 24; disp. II sec. 1 art. 1; disp. XXIII sec. 8 art. 8; disp. XX sec. 1 art. 31-32; disp. XLVII sec. 14 art. 5.

or a memory image, or an image of mental thing, these two cognitive intentions are distinguished. Many scholastics, especially John of St. Thomas (†1644) and Suárez, agree on this. However, contrary to Suárez, John argued that the formal object of logic referred to as *ratio quae attingitur* – but not of metaphysics – are *secundae intentiones*³³. In the prologue to the disputation LIV, Suárez confirms the importance of the theory of being of reason both for human knowledge in general and for metaphysics itself, as well as for other sciences, and even taking into account the theology itself, he also refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias, St. Thomas and Aristotle to justify his own position³⁴.

The second order of cognitive intentions is merely reflective, and the status of the object that occurs in the second intention is referred to as *pure rationis* or *pure obiectivus*, whereas the very act of knowing the second intention by the intellect is a pure mental relation (*relatio rationis*)³⁵. The second intention of the intellect, therefore, is the objective relation of reason, and is fundamentally different from the first intention being a real one. The first or formal intention differs because the second one is rather an act of objectifying reflection, that is, it remains a reflection on the object as a cognitive object in the intellect. It should be inferred that this applies to all metaphysical concepts that refer to the real order of thing, irrespective of whether they are the object of real transcendental, intellectual, abstract cognition. However, as purely mental constructs and since they are objects in the knowing intellect, all mind-dependent entities exist exclusively as beings of reason in a purely cognitive manner.

³³ IOANNIS A SANCTO THOMA. *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*. Vol. 1: *Ars Logica*. Taurini: P.B. Reiser 1930 q. II (*De ente rationis logico, quod est secunda intentio*).

³⁴ F. SUÁREZ. *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. LIV prol.; cf. S. THOMAE AQUINATIS. In *Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*. Altera Editio attende recognita. Taurini: Ex Officina Libraria Marietti 1826 p. 193-196 (b. IV lec. 4 esp. art. 574-576); ALEXANDER DE APHRODISIAS. In *Aristotelis Metaphysic Commentaria*. Ed. M. Hayduck. In: *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*. Vol. 1. Berolini: Georg Reimer 1891 p. 458; ARYSTOTELES. *Metafizyka*. Vol. 1-2. Transl. T. Żeleźnik. Ed. M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk. Lublin 1996 b. IV 1003b 8-11 and b. VI 1027b 34-1028a3; see also J.P. DOYLE. Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit. "The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly" 65:1991 p. 311-334, esp. p. 327-333; IDEM. *Extrinsic Cognoscibility: A Seventeenth Century Supertranscendental Notion*. "The Modern Schoolman" 68:1990 p. 57-80.

³⁵ IOANNIS A SANCTO THOMA. *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*. Vol. 1: *Ars Logica*. Parisiis: L. Vivès 1883 (rep. Taurini: P.B. Reiser 1930) q. II 285b33-286a11 and 291a26. On the second intentions, see also GUILLELMI DE OCKHAM. *Expositio in Librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis*. In: *Opera philosophica et theologica, cura Instituti Franciscani, Universitatis S. Bonaventurae. Opera philosophica*. Vol. 2. Ed. A Gambates. S. Brown. New York 1978 p. 155; W. OCKHAM. *Suma logiczna*. Tłum. T. Włodarczyk. Warszawa 1971 p. 55-58 (b. I art. 2).

CONCLUSIONS

It is worth recalling the understanding of the beings of reason by three eminent philosophers of the Polish origin: Marcin Śmiglecki, S.J. (†1618)³⁶, Jan Morawski, S.J. (†1700)³⁷ and Maksymilian Wietrowski, S.J. (†1737)³⁸, who tend to define the being of reason in a logical order rather than metaphysical, and even in a *super-transcendental* one. They demonstrated various counterfactual arguments for and against the existence of impossible and fictional beings. Suffice it to say that, on the basis of Wietrowski's analysis, it can be concluded that regardless of whether the being of reason is an object of logic or metaphysics, it is a being that exists in a specific ontological order of the intellect during its ongoing abstract cognition. This kind of being cannot really exist except the intellect. Similar to Śmiglecki and Morawski, Wietrowski defines this order as the purely-objective or purely-mental, or even the supertranscendental order as something beyond the transcendental nature of reality. In this sense, metaphysical knowledge is constituted by something that derives not from the position of reality or existence, but from the purely intentional realm.

The being of reason (*ens rationis*) has *esse essentiae* in the sense that its being in the intellect is just a kind of intentional representation. On this basis only, it is not a real being, but a cognitive being (*ens cognitum*) that is included in a direct intellectual apprehension, and that is what makes it possess a certain form of essence; it simply has a certain form of quasi-essence derived exclusively from the intellect (*esse essentiae*). It is a being of second nature or *ens secundum quid* (being to some extent). However, it has no real existence beyond the intellect. Contrary to this, a being which is independent in itself has the real status of *esse* in its intrinsic nature conditioned by existence. It can be defined by various terms, such as *esse simpliciter reale* (entitled to *actus ultimus*); *esse substantiae* (entitled to *esse simpliciter et esse verum*); *esse praedicamentale* (also entitled to *esse simpliciter*).

³⁶ See P. MARTINUS SMIGLECIUS. *Logica selectis disputationibus et questionibus illustrata, in qua quicquid in Aristotelico Organo vel cognitu necessarium, vel obscuritate perplexum, tam clare et perspicue, quam solide ac nervose petraantur*. Vo. 1. Ingolstadii: ex typ. Ederiano apud Elisabetham Amgermariam 1618 (rep. Oxford 1634).

³⁷ See P. IOANNIS MORAWSKI. *Totius philosophiae principia per quaestiones de ente in communi ex praelectionibus*. Editio Secunda. Typis S.R.M. Collegii Posnan. Soc. Ies. Superiorum permissu. Posnaniae 1682 disp. I (*De notionibus entis realis & rationis*). q. II (*Utrum ab intellectu possit cognosci objectum distinctum ab omni ente reali*) p. 15-36 (*De ente rationis*).

³⁸ See P. MAXIMILIANI WIETROWSKI. *Philosophia disputata, in qua comprehenduntur conclusiones ex universa philosophia Aristotelis, doctrinis philosophicis illustratae, auctoritatibus firmatae, rationibus robotatae, nec non ab argumentis contrariis vindicatae etc.* Pragae: Typis Universitatis Caroli Ferdinandi in Coll. Soc. Jesu ad S. Clem. 1697 par. I (*Logica*). esp. Concl. 13. cap. 1 art. 1 and art. 4; cap. 2 art. 4; concl. 14 cap. 2 art. 1, 3-4.

In this regard, a being of reason conditioned by the *esse intelligibile* has nothing but *esse essentiae* and *cogitatum*.

Considering a different perspective, God also possesses by virtue of divine power (*a potentia Dei*) and perfect intellect all *entia possibilia* (possible beings), excluding impossible beings. These *entia possibilia* are real ideas or a formal beings capable of being existent, or capable of being a real and true entities when they become embodied to exist on their own. However, creatures do not have eternal existence before creation because they were or are being created in time. Thus, after creation and by the very fact of real existence, every real being becomes an independent by itself and respectively by the transcendental *esse essentiae* and *esse substantiae*. Some thinkers, such as Duns Scotus (†1308), even use the *esse quoddam diminutum* (diminished being) to name these real ideas in God's intellect³⁹. A diminished being would then exist somewhere between the real being and the being of reason. However, it cannot be defined neither as real nor as a being of reason which is solely dependent on the human intellect. Scotus excluded from the subject of metaphysics these beings of reason which are internally contradicted (e.g. chimera or other *entia impossibilia*)⁴⁰. Henry of Ghent (†1293), quite similar to Scotus, excluded the beings of reason from metaphysics, however also noted that ideas in the mind of God have *esse essentiae* and only when they are created do they receive *esse existentiae*.

By the very fact of being transcendental and intelligible (that is, possible to be known in the real dimension), all real beings are *aptitudo ad existentiam*. But at the same time we see that while the existence of beings of reason and their essential properties result from the intellect's cognition, they possess only *esse essentiae*. Suárez also claims that being of reason have a second intelligibility⁴¹. By the very fact that they are known and created in the intellect, the beings of reason are constituted externally to themselves from *esse essentiae* intentionally added by the intellect itself. Nevertheless, they exist objectively in the intellect as purely cognitive beings.

³⁹ Suárez evokes Scotus' concept of diminished being. See F. SUÁREZ. *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. XXXI sec. 2 art. 1. On diminished being in *Disputationes* see also disp. XX sec. 1 art. 30; disp. XXXI sec. 2 art. 1-2; disp. XXX sec. 15 art. 27. On Scotus' concept, see also W. PARK. *Haecceitas and the Bare Particular*. "Review of Metaphysics" 44:1990 p. 375-397.

⁴⁰ JOANNES DUNS SCOTI. *Quodlibeta III* p. 93-94; cf. O. BOULINOIS. *Être et représentation* p. 459-462.

⁴¹ F. SUÁREZ. *De anima*. In: *Opera omnia*. Editio nova a C. Berton. Vol. 2-3. Parisiis: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, Bibliopolam editorem 1851 b. IV art. 1. 4.

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POJĘCIE BYTU MYŚLNEGO JAKO OSTATNI KROK W POZNANIU METAFIZYCZNYM W UJĘCIU FRANCISZKA SUÁREZA

Streszczenie: Artykuł dotyczy analizy bytu myślnego w ujęciu F. Suáreza (†1617). Teoria ta jest uważana za koncepcję pograniczną między metafizyką a logiką. Suárez w swoim dziele *Disputationes metaphysicae* powraca do klasycznego podziału na byt realny (*ens reale*) i byt myślny (*ens rationis*). W jego metafizyce teoria bytu myślnego okazuje się być związana z pojęciem bytu przedmiotowego (*ens obiectivum*), bytu poznawczego (*ens cognitum*), z pierwszą i drugą intencją intelektu (*prima et secunda intentio*). Suárez odchodzi od tradycyjnego rozumienia przedmiotu metafizyki i tym samym przesuwa klasyczną refleksję nad bytem w stronę nowożytnego esencjalizmu. Jego metafizyka nie rozważa bytu w perspektywie egzystencjalnej, dotychczas wykładanej *ad mentem Divi Thomae*, ale okazuje się być badaniem z perspektywy wyabstrahowanego bytu, pojętego jako *ratio entis*, tj. realna istota bytu (*essentia realis*). W ostatniej dysputacji LIV Suárez modyfikuje klasyczną definicję przedmiotu metafizyki i pojmuje go w porządku esencjalnym (noetycznym). Pozwala mu to na włączenie w zakres rozważań metafizycznych bytu myślnego i innych bytów intencjonalnych, jak byty niemożliwe (*entia impossibilia*). Teoria Suáreza pozwala dokładniej wyjaśnić naturę wszystkich przedmiotów czystego intelektu, a tym samym przybliżyć metafizykę do prawdziwości jej przedmiotu.

Słowa kluczowe: Franciszek Suárez, byt myślny, *ens rationis*, poznanie metafizyczne.